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Chapter 6
Implications of the Difficult
Economy for Company-Sponsored
Retirement Plans
Anna M. Rappaport

After two decades of economic growth in the United States, a combination
of forces has propelled the economy and beneWt plan sponsors into a new
and less prosperous environment. Equity markets, particularly NASDAQ
stocks, have fallen dramatically, and some stocks are down 80 percent or
more from their recent highs (Value Line Investment Survey 2001). High
technology, once an engine of growth, has fallen out of favor. An electric
power crisis gripped California and people speculate about similar problems for other parts of the country. Utility companies, long seen as a safe
investment, now seem to have an uncertain future. Many Wnancial service
and insurance Wrms have released disappointing earnings.
How have pensions responded to this negative economic news? In theory,
pensions are long-term arrangements, so pension investing should reXect
the long-term prognosis for the economy. In the United States, pensions
are provided by both deWned beneWt (DB) and deWned contribution (DC)
plans, with sponsors making investment decisions in the DB case, and
employees making many more decisions in DC case. In both types of plans,
investment decisions should be made with a view to the long term during
which funds will be accumulated, as well as the lengthy period during which
funds will be drawn down.
In practice, of course, pension plans have always operated in an environment of economic turmoil and change. Nevertheless, in our view, recent
economic developments will likely have a greater impact on pension plans
than did earlier shifts in economic conditions. This is partly because of
the growth of DC plans, which implies that more of the pension assets
are employee-controlled. Though some participants take the long view,
others Wnd this difWcult to do, especially if they are nearing retirement.
In addition, many people were unprepared for the reemergence of the
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business cycle, since the period of economic growth leading up to 2001 was
so very long.
The economic uncertainty also coincides with another beneWts trend,
namely, the growing importance of employee stock ownership. The National
Center for Employee Ownership recently reported that 13 percent of employer stock is now owned by employees through various employee beneWt
programs and broad-based stock option programs (NCEO 2001). Firms that
stressed employee ownership in the past may now be forced to revisit retirement beneWt design, in view of the stock market’s erratic performance.
The prevalence of company stock in retirement plans and other compensation means that employees have become concerned not just about market performance, but also about the performance of their own company’s
stock. Table 1 illustrates the performance of broad market indexes for one
and Wve years ending Wrst quarter, 2001, as compared to well and poorly
performing Dow index individual stocks. The impact of the economy on
individual plans depends on the plan’s speciWc investments and, of course,
on participants’ investment elections. Those heavily concentrated in a single
company stock are likely to be more exposed to market Xuctuations, than
are more broadly diversiWed plans holding the market basket.
When stock is available as a DC plan investment, the amount people elect
to hold in company stock depends on whether there is employer-directed
investment in that stock. Table 2 conWrms that plans having employerdirected investments tend to be more heavily concentrated in equities overall, than are other DC plans. Furthermore, DC participants tend to invest
20 percent of their account balances in company stock when investment
in employer stock is voluntary. But when an employer directs some of the
balance to company stock, 48 percent of the total balance (including 29
percent of the participant-directed balance) tends to be invested in company stock (Holden and VanDerhei 2001).

Table 1. Performance of Stock Market Indexes Compared to Individual

S&P 500
NASDAQ
Dow winners
Phillip Morris
Boeing
Dow losers
AT&T
Intel

1-year change
(ending 3/31/01)

5-year change
(ending 3/31/01)

−23%
−60%

+80%
+67%

+126%
+47%
−62%
−60%

Source: Wall Street Journal, 2001 <www.wsj.com>.

Wal-Mart
Microsoft
AT&T
Kodak

+339%
+324%
−48%
−44%
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Another theme inXuencing the corporate environment is the “war for
talent.” Over 90 percent of multinational employers indicated that this is
a priority in the human resources Weld (Mercer 1999). The recruiting and
attraction problems that companies face vary with the business cycle as well
as the product life cycle, implying a need for speciWc skills. More recently,
companies have been faced with having to simultaneously layoff and hire
for growth areas, at the same. Looking at the long term, there will be signiWcant skill shortages as the baby boomers retire with a smaller cohort
replacing them (see Lofgren et al. this volume; Riche this volume). Even
though equity prices have declined, employment has thus far remained relatively robust; business is still faced with key skill shortages. Figure 1 illustrates U.S. unemployment patterns in the last thirty years, indicating that it
remains below historical levels.
In the twenty-Wrst century, demographics will increasingly interact with
economics. Slowly, the deWnition of retirement is changing, as people build
Table 2: Impact of Company Stock on Asset Allocation by Age (1999)
Age
cohort

Equity
funds

Company
stock

Balanced
funds

Bond
funds

Plans with employer-directed and participant-directed balances
Total balances (employer-directed and participant-directed)
20s
36.6%
48.1%
5.5%
30s
32.1
52.4
5.3
40s
30.2
50.9
5.6
50s
29.8
46.4
6.4
60s
28.8
36.1
7.2
All
30.2
47.6
6.0

0.6%
0.7
1.1
1.5
2.9
1.4

Participant-directed balances only
20s
47.2
30s
46.6
40s
44.2
50s
41.0
60s
35.6
All
42.1

0.8
1.0
1.6
2.1
3.6
2.0

34.8
33.3
30.9
28.8
22.6
29.3

7.0
7.5
7.9
8.2
8.7
8.1

Money
funds

3.4%
2.2
3.3
4.5
8.7
4.2
3.9
2.8
4.5
6.0
10.6
5.6

Plans with company stock investment option but no employer-directed contributions
Total balances
20s
58.6
17.7
8.3
1.7
6.2
30s
56.5
19.5
8.6
1.9
5.1
40s
51.1
20.9
9.2
2.3
5.5
50s
45.9
20.4
10.4
3.1
6.2
60s
38.2
18.7
11.3
4.1
8.4
All
48.7
20.2
9.7
2.7
6.1

GICs a

5.4%
7.0
8.4
11.2
15.9
10.2
6.1
8.6
10.4
13.4
18.5
12.5

4.4
5.9
8.6
12.1
17.6
10.4

Source: Derived from Holden and VanDerhei (2001).
Minor investment options are not shown; therefore row percentages will not add to 100
percent. Employer-directed balances are invested in the plan sponsor’s company stock.
a
Guaranteed investment contracts.
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phased retirement programs and move into new careers. Baby boomers
are crossing the age-55 threshold, the age at which retirement has been permitted in many corporate pension plans. Some organizations have even
earlier retirement ages, as in public utilities and health care. What is changing is that workers with liberal early retirement beneWts are increasingly
leaving their long-term employers, and then they are moving into “bridge”
jobs, or jobs in new organizations that can be part time or in a new area.

Concerns Regarding Retirement Plan Financing
Poor capital market performance has a negative effect on retirement plans,
though how this plays out depends on the relative movement of equity markets and interest rates. Sometimes changes in these items offset each other,
and in other cases, they compound each other. Indeed, if pension expense
is large compared to the earnings of the company, a change in pension
expense results in a material change in earnings per share.

Issues Pertinent to Defined Benefit Plan Finances
A plan sponsor offering a DB plan must spread long-term plan costs over
employees’ working lifetimes, based on actuarial methods and assumptions.
The one-year cost of a pension plan is speciWed as the value of beneWts
earned (or attributed to) the current year, adjusted by a portion of the difference between plan assets and liabilities. If plan assets exceed liabilities,
pension law and accounting standards consider the plan to be overfunded;
if liabilities exceed assets, there is an unfunded liability.1 For DB plan valuation, pension expense must be computed as the amount charged for the
plan and reported in the organization’s proWt and loss statement; this value

Figure 1. U.S. unemployment rates over time. Source: U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2000). Unemployment rate in 2001 an average of Wrst 7
months.
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is determined subject to the requirements of the accounting profession.
Pension contributions refer to the cash contributed to the plan, and amounts
are determined by U.S. pension law.
Table 3 compares the key characteristics of these alternative pension cost
calculations, which differ because they serve different underlying goals. For
Table 3. Characteristics of Pension Expense and Pension Contributions
Pension expense
(amount charge to
proWt and loss)
Applicable rules

Goals

Securities and Exchange
requirements and Wnancial rules (Statement of
Financial Standards
Number 87)
Proper matching of
revenue and expense
and comparability of
results between
companies

Choice of methods
for calculation
Very limited
Method prescribed
Market value, with
for measurement
some permitted
of assets
Discount rate used in
Must be based on
calculating liabilities
current market and
adjusted annually
if rates change
Special problems
Changes in discount
with calculation
rates create signiWcant
volatility; can be a
problem when asset
values and discount
rates drop at the same
time

Added costs for plans
If assets exceed
liabilities

Pension contributions
(cash contributed
to pension fund)
Federal law, the Internal
Code deWned a minimum
contribution and a
maximum limit
For the minimum,
security of plan
participants and for
the limitation of what
can be invested tax
deferred fund
More Xexibility
Market value, with
some permitted
Based on long-term
expected

In some cases, contributions
are volatile. There are
discontinuities the
spreading of surplus and
liability. If there is a
surplus and liability.
If there is a surplus,
no contribution is allowed.
If the unfunded liabilities
exceed limits, extra
contributions are needed
None
Additional PBGC premiums
are required
The excess (or surplus)
No contribution is
is used to offset pension
permitted
cost and gradually
recognized as income
in the proWt loss statement

Source: William M. Mercer, Inc., unpublished.
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accounting rules, one goal is to match revenue and expense, since the allocation of costs over time is critical. A second objective is to support comparability of Wnancial results across organizations. For pension funding
law, the intent is to ensure that adequate funds are set aside to meet obligations to participants, and also to ensure that funds on which investment
income tax is deferred are not excessive. These two sets of rules sometimes
come into conXict, making it difWcult for the nonspecialist to interpret the
differences.
When interest rates fall and equity returns disappoint, this has a particularly painful impact on DB plans. The 2000 market decline produced
substantial increases in both pension expense and pension contributions
for some organizations, due to declines in assets and increases in liabilities.
Some Wrms also had very large pension liabilities compared to their shareholder equity and other measures of organization size.
An illustration of how pension costs can be affected appears in Table 4.
Here the cost can be considered to be the value of beneWts earned in the
current period, since assets fully cover beneWts earned in the past. However,
if asset values fall by 25 percent and the value of liabilities rises by 10 percent, the plan’s Wnancial position changes dramatically. A 50 basis-point
drop in the discount rate boosts plan liabilities by about 10 percent. To
show how this unfavorable climate can produce major changes in the sponsoring company’s Wnancial position, note that Company A’s cost is the
Table 4. Illustration of Pension Plan Financial Position Under Different Scenarios
Company A—
established company

Scenario 1: illustration of pension plan Wnancial position:
Value of beneWts earned, liabilities and assets for two companies
Value of beneWts earned
in current year
$10,000,000
Liability for beneWts
Earned to date
$60,000,000
Assets
$60,000,000

Company B—
mature company:
retirees outnumber
active employees

$10,000,000
$150,000,000
$150,000,000

Scenario 2: illustration of pension plan Wnancial position changes due to
adverse change in economic situation: Discount rate up ½%, assets down 25%
Value of beneWts earned
in current year—lower
$11,000,000
$11,000,000
Liability for beneWts
earned to date
$66,000,000
$165,000,000
Assets
$45,000,000
$112,500,000
Unfunded amount to be
spread into future costs
$21,000,000
$52,500,000
Source: Author’s calculations.
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$11M beneWt value plus amortization of $21M. Company B must amortize
$52.5M. The situation would be even more dramatic had assets exceeded
liabilities prior to the change; the Wrm would have gone from making no
contribution to having to make a substantial contribution. Such changes in
pension expenses and contributions can be moderated somewhat by using
smoothing techniques, but these can only work to some extent.
An indication of the Wnancial health of DB plans prior to the market
downturn is available from data collected by the Pension BeneWt Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC 1999). At the outset of 1997, underfunded DB plans
held assets reported at $353B and liabilities of $401B, for a total underfunding of $48B. By contrast, overfunded plans held assets of $1,014B and
liabilities of $790B for a total overfunding level of $223B. What this meant
is that many plan sponsors entered the downturn with very well funded
plans; indeed some had not made cash contributions for several years.
In practice, market Xuctuations affect each pension plan’s asset mix,
funding level, and investment policy differently. While the precise picture
for DB plans going forward is not fully known yet, some have called 2000
“the worst year in pension history” (Ryan 2001). This is based on expected
returns on pension assets assuming a representative portfolio of 5 percent
cash, 30 percent bonds, 60 percent S&P 500 equities, and 5 percent international equities. This asset mix produced an asset return of 2.5 percent for
2000, which combined with an anticipated increase in pension liabilities
of 26 percent. The result for this representative DB plan was a negative
change in funding by 28.5 percent. By contrast, the worse previous year for
DB plans was 1995, when the funding position fell by 12.5 percent (Ryan
2001).2 Clearly, an unfavorable economic environment will likely increase
both pension expense and funding requirements for many Wrms. To the
extent that a plan sponsor bases its funding and expense calculations on
smoothed asset values, the impact may be smaller; for others, it will be of
greater concern.

Issues Specific to Defined Contribution Pensions
The 1990s saw rapid growth in retirement system assets, resulting from
mainly from DC plan growth. When markets fell (see Figure 2), this was to
some extent offset by new cash Xowing into retirement account mutual funds
(Investment Company Institute 2001). In other words, DC plan Wnances
rose even in unfavorable equity market periods, due to the continued interest of participants in equity markets.
While smoothing can take place in DB plans, investment variability
directly affects individual account balances in DC plans. Such changes do
not directly impact the plan sponsor, but poor investment results can harm
morale and may even cause employees to delay retirement (Even and
Macpherson, this volume). When employees are dissatisWed with beneWts,
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this can also increase turnover. Some DC plans are organized as employee
stock ownership plans, and in other cases, the employer match in a 401(k)
plan may be entirely in company stock. It is also the case that employee contributions are sometimes automatically invested in company stock, though
in many instances stock may be one of several investment options. Table 5
shows that plans offering company stock tend to have participants allocate
somewhat more of their assets in equity, on average, than plans not permitting company stock.

Figure 2. Mutual fund retirement assets, 1990–2000 ($ billions). Source: Investment
Company Institute. Components may not add to totals because of rounding.

Table 5. Average Asset Allocation by Investment Options (1999)
Plans
All plans
Plans without company
stock or GICs
Plans with GICsa
Plans with company stock
Plans with company stock
and GICsa

Equity
funds

Company Balanced Bond
Money
stock
funds
funds
funds
(percentage of account balances)

GICsa

53.4

19.1

6.7

4.6

4

10.5

71.1
62.3
44.5

na
na
36.3

9.7
10.6
3.9

9.0
3.7
6.7

7.7
3.9
5.5

na
16.8
na

47.9

23.9

5.5

1.8

1.6

18.7

Source: Derived from Holden and VanDerhei (2001).
a
Guaranteed investment contracts.
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One measure of the success of a DC plan is the plan’s ability to deliver
enough money to ensure that participants can afford to retire. Yet many
plan sponsors do not focus on this outcome, preferring instead to offer participants the opportunity to save more and diversity investment portfolios.
Typically, employers do not investigate actual account balances and savings
rates, nor do they project them to retirement. Larger employers typically
offer a combination of DB and DC plans, and while they may predict expected DB beneWts, they are less likely to look at projected savings in DC
plans. It is not uncommon for companies to presume that beneWts will be
adequate, if employees contribute the maximum they are eligible to receive
their company match. Midsized employers in particular tend not to study
these issues in much depth.
Going forward, however, the focus may become one of greater attention
to retirement. In this case, plan sponsors will be required to ask whether
employees are saving enough money for retirement, whether the available investment options provide an adequate range of choice, and whether employees appear to make reasonable asset allocation decisions. The implications
of investment variability may become very different as well. For companies
that offer both a DB and DC plan, it may be easier to manage expectations
than for those that offer only DCs. In the DC-only case, employers might
elect to redesign their basic plans, the investment options offered, and/or
the participant education program (Wray 2001).
In considering these issues, it is important to remember that nearly all
DC accumulations tend to be paid out as lump sums, and an increasing
number of DB plans offer lump sums as well (Mitchell this volume). In
contrast to the life annuity payout form, lump sums expose retirees to a
wide range of risks including the possibility of outliving assets, investment
losses, unexpected medical costs, cost of care due to frailty, loss of a spouse,
and loss of functionality (Rappaport 2000).

How Market Volatility Affects Older Workers
People reaching retirement in the United States today have widely different
levels of wealth, as well as different resources and levels of income. For
instance, the poorest two quintiles of the elderly received more than 80
percent of income from Social Security, and had a net worth excluding
home equity of under $21,000 (in 1996; Friedland 1999). Poor equity
markets would therefore have little effect on this group. On the other hand,
this group is also the most likely to need employment in later life, due to
economic reasons. If fewer jobs are available, or if pay is lower, this group
will be hardest hit. At the top end of the economic spectrum are older persons having substantial wealth. These people have considerable Wnancial
investments, some of which are equities, and hence they will be directly
affected by poor market performance. For this group, some of the impact
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of a decline in investment values will also be felt via reductions in estates or
bequests, rather than through cuts in living standards during retirement.
While many in this group will have adequate resources for a comfortable
retirement, they may still feel vulnerable to economic volatility.
In the middle of the distribution of well-being are older persons who
depend on diverse income sources and have middling Wnancial assets. Some
have DB pension plans, and for them, market Xuctuations such as those
experienced in the recent past will likely have only a modest effect. In contrast, retirees having only a DC plan may be hurt when the market sinks.
Those holding a riskier portfolio, which loses value, may need to postpone
retirement or return to work, and/or cut living standards.
Table 2 reported DC plan asset allocations for those plans that included
company stock as an investment option. In Table 6 we depict average asset
allocation by age for plans with and without company stock. For employees
in their 60s, 44 percent of 401(k) account balances are invested in equity
funds, 16 percent in company stock and 7 percent in balanced funds
(Holden and VanDerhei 2001). If we assume balanced funds are half stock,
this accounts for a total 63 percent of plan assets in equities for employees
in their 60s; across participants of all ages, the proportion in equities is 76
percent. To the extent that DC plans represent a signiWcant component of
retirement assets, equity returns are a major concern.

Retiree Health Issues
Somewhat distinct issues arise when calculating retiree health plan costs.
One reason is that most such plans are operated on a pay-as-you-go basis;
that is, annual cash contributions are set to cover each year’s beneWt payouts. For purposes of the proWt and loss statement, these beneWt plans
are treated like pensions, and as such, they are subject to special accounting rules. These rules require that the sponsoring company calculate a
balance sheet liability representing the discounted present value of beneWts
for retirees, as well as for active employees based on service to date. While
equity markets do not directly inXuence the costs of such pay-as-you-go
plans, the concern is that health care costs have risen quite rapidly recently.
Figure 3 shows total medical cost trends over the period 1990–2000. Per
capita retiree health care costs increased in 1999 by 10.7 percent for retirees
not yet eligible for Medicare, and 17 percent for retirees who were Medicare
eligible (Mercer 2001). Prescription drug costs are a major factor in the
costs for the Medicare eligible retirees.
In companies where both pension and retiree health costs are rising
simultaneously, management will be forced to reassess options for bringing
these retiree health costs under control. These include boosting retiree contributions for retiree health insurance, tightening plan eligibility, and modifying beneWts so as to reduce costs. They might also involve rearranging

63.4%
60.6
55.9
51.7
44.2
53.4

20s
30s
40s
50s
60s
All

7.3%
6.7
6.7
6.7
6.7
6.7

Balanced
funds
3.8%
3.6
3.9
4.7
6.8
4.6

Bond
funds

Source: Derived from Holden and VanDerhei (2001).
a
Guaranteed investment contracts.

Equity
funds
3.9%
3.4
3.8
4.0
4.9
4.0

3.8%
4.9
7.9
11.6
19.2
10.5

16.4%
19.5
20.4
19.4
15.6
19.1

Money
Company
stock
funds
GICsa
(percentage of account balances)
0.3%
0.3
0.4
0.9
1.7
0.7

Other
stable value
funds
0.7%
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.8

Other

0.4%
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.3

Unknown

100.0%
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

Total

10:36 AM

Age
cohort

1/8/03

Table 6. Average Asset Allocation in 401(k) Plans for Age (1999)

07chap6.qxd
Page 147

The Difficult Economy and Company-Sponsored Plans
147

07chap6.qxd

1/8/03

148

10:36 AM

Page 148

Anna M. Rappaport

the pension package to shift some beneWt costs to employees, so as to
increase workers’ incentives to save for retirement.

Conclusions
There is considerable uncertainty as to how long and how deep this economic downturn will be. Retirement plan sponsors, employees, and retirees
are coping with a combination of difWcult equity markets, lower interest
rates, and uncertain job market conditions. Under such circumstances,
plan sponsors may respond by using permitted smoothing methods to
reduce the impact on their Wnancial statements, and by careful selection
of actuarial assumptions within acceptable parameters. In the short to
medium term, investment strategies will also be reviewed, although not necessarily changed. DC plan sponsors are being called on to increase communication to plan participants about market conditions, helping them put
market movements in historical perspective. Increased oversight of fund
choices may also be expected.
Long-term responses will likely be more varied. Cost pressures can force
or encourage some plan sponsors to terminate DB plans, continuing a
long-term trend in the United States. Other employers will review plan
design, seeking a greater degree of risk management. This is consistent with
the overall trend in retirement plans during the last decade that has transferred risk from employers to employees. Employers have terminated or
frozen traditional DB pension plans, replaced them with cash balance
plans, 401(k) pensions, and other DC arrangements. New Wrms offer no
retirement beneWts, or DC plans alone. Companies have increasingly relied

Figure 3. Trends in medical care costs over time. Source: Merck Incorporated
(2000).
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on their own stock as a savings and retirement vehicle, and employer subsidies for retiree medical beneWts have been reduced or eliminated.
For the most part, employees have accepted this trend toward risk transfer. One reason is likely the buoyant equity market over the last two decades.
Many people may believe that their retirement savings accounts (and other
assets) were a sufWcient cushion against such risks. But if equity markets
stay depressed, employer and employee assumptions about retirement security are due for a fundamental reevaluation. This will Wrst occur at companies that traditionally have emphasized stock purchase through ESOPs,
broad-based stock option plans, and by using stock to match employees’
401(k) contributions. It will be sharpest when Wrms experience a sharp
and prolonged downturn in the value of that stock. Of course, many of
these companies also suffer from other problems (including survival), so
that retirement plan issues may be postponed. Should these Wrms then be
acquired, the new owner must address such issues. If they are not acquired,
they often lack Wnancial resources sufWcient to make any substantive improvements in beneWt offerings. Such companies may experience greater
turnover, as their employees seek better venues in which to accumulate
wealth for retirement.
For other companies, however, the problems will be less obvious and will
not seem to require such immediate action. But a long-term recession will
nevertheless challenge many peoples’ fundamental assumptions. Plan sponsors have assumed double-digit investment returns will continue. Likewise,
many employees and retirees anticipate that the high returns of the last
two decades will persist. If expectations are not met, plan sponsors may
need to modify their retirement programs, and baby boomers will either
have to retire later, consume less, or both. Some retirees not currently working may have to return to work, as resources dwindle.
Business cycles have long been part of the pension planning environment. Yet severe downturns challenge thinking, if people and organizations
have forgotten that such downturns can and do occur. In the past, DB plan
sponsors generally took into account business cycle patterns when they
managed pension plans; such views are less prevalent today. In a DC environment, the impact of equity market shocks is directly absorbed by participants. As the environment increasingly moves to one where participants
bear risk, it is important that they learn to plan better for economic shocks.
Notes
1. Different methods can be used to value both assets and liabilities, so that a
plan might have an unfunded liability according to one calculation but a surplus in
another; see McGill et al. (1996).
2. The impact of assumptions is also greater today than when ERISA was enacted
in 1974. Federal rule changes have imposed stricter limits on plan funding, restricting well-funded plans from making deductible contributions, and poorly funded
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plans must now make extra contributions to catch up faster. Even the deWnition of
funding has changed, so that market Xuctuations can now have a more dramatic
impact on plan funding. Some Wrms are also holding higher equity allocations in
their pension plans and hence will be more vulnerable to changes in equity prices.
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